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Abstract
A key question is whether the very successful, largely short-haul LCC business
model can work over long-haul sectors? This paper compares the cost and other
advantages of LCCs and evaluates how far they might be applied to long-haul sectors.
It is estimated that cost advantages might be much lower than the 50-60% on short-
hauls. Other factors such as the adoption by network airlines of some LCC features and
their likely competitive response, the limited potential for market stimulation, the need
for dense markets and feed traffic all combine to cast doubt on the widespread
establishment of the business model for long-haul flights.
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21. Introduction
The idea of a low-cost long-haul airline is not new but previous attempts have not
been successful. Since their demise, however, new technologies and business processes
have been developed, so that it is appropriate to re-examine the economics of these
services. One of the first of such ventures was Laker Airways that in 1977 transformed
its UK charter operations into a long-haul ‘no frills’ airline. Its first ‘SkyTrain’ flight
was London Gatwick to New York and it subsequently added Los Angeles and Miami.
The features it had in common with today’s low-cost business model were:
 Point-to-point operations, with no interlining or transfers
 In flight catering available at extra cost
 High density single class seating
The airline had a single aircraft type, the McDonnell Douglas DC10, with one class
345 seats, and offered an introductory fare of £32.50 compared to the lowest existing
equivalent fare of just under £100. It is doubtful whether this cut in fares was
sustainable, another LCC feature being the ability to offer large reductions in fares
based on significantly lower unit costs. In order to reduce the disadvantage of having
no distribution system, initially it took no advance bookings, with passengers having to
queue at the airport or town terminal for each flight. It failed in 1982 as a result of the
economic downturn in the early 1980s, strong competition from other transatlantic
carriers and the rapid depreciation of its base country currency. The nature of the
SkyTrain product changed considerably from its introduction, first offering bookable
and advance purchase tickets and later adding a ‘Regency Class’ cabin (Banks, 1982).
3The Laker venture was a stand-alone operation. Soon after its demise, in 1983, a US
based low-cost airline People Express started international operations from New York
to London Gatwick, later adding Montreal and Brussels. This differed in being an
expansion from a very successful low cost domestic base, and in providing connecting
flights at its Newark hub. It also had some premium class seats, although (in common
with Southwest and later LCCs) its mantra was simplicity. It also charged US$3 for
checked baggage, a practice that seems to be making a revival. Over-expansion and
management problems led to its demise in 1987.
Since the failure of these two long-haul LCCs, the internet has become an effective
tool for selling airlines seats. This would have allowed them to go direct to the market,
bi-passing costly travel agents that were often tied to network carriers. Laker’s
alternative of the sale of seats on the day of departure at the airport or town terminal
would never have been accepted by much of the potential market. Second, LCCs have
developed a simpler means of fare differentiation by time of booking, which has
become an effective alternative to the previously very successful revenue management
techniques of the network airlines.
Since these two examples, European charter airlines have moved into long-haul
markets and also started to market their flights as scheduled or at least part of their
capacity sold as ‘seat only’. Ryanair’s and AirAsia’s announcement of their intentions
to move into long-haul markets has added to interest in the potential for such services.
A previous paper addressed the degree to which the low-cost model could be applied
to long-haul operations (Francis et al, 2007). That study (based on 2003 data)
concluded that a low-cost long-haul operation could only achieve a 20% cost advantage
over network carriers compared to 50% on short/medium haul flights. Their definition
of long-haul flights will also be adopted here: any sector that cannot be operated by an
4unconverted A320 or B737, the workhorses of the low-cost business model to date.
This effectively means flights of six hours or more.1
The head of Boeing’s commercial aircraft division thought that ‘there might be a
market for low-cost transatlantic flights; any further and creature comforts will be
required’ (Morgan, 2007). However, existing long-haul Y-class cabins offer seat
comfort that is scarcely better than many short-haul LCCs. Furthermore other in-flight
amenities would certainly be available for purchase on a long-haul LCC.
This paper examines the potential for long-haul LCCs, first by reviewing previous
proposals, looking at costs and competitive reactions before assessing market
stimulation and the need for feed. Regulatory aspects, in particular traffic rights, have
not been considered, and there are still many restrictions in place in long-haul markets.
However, the recent EU/US open skies agreement has removed any barrier to LCC
entry on transatlantic routes and these perhaps offer some of the most likely focus
initially.
2. Previous ‘LCC’ long-haul services and proposals
The most recent experiment with long-haul low cost flying was based in Hong Kong.
Oasis Hong Kong operated Hong Kong/London with a two-class B747-400 for 18
months before failing; it originally planned a high density seating aircraft with low-cost
airline connections available at the London end. This was modified to a two-class
cabin, with London Gatwick selected rather than Stansted.
1 although JetBlue operates Boston/Long Beach non-stop with a A320 in 6:30 hours.
5There has also been a variety of ideas and even more concrete proposals for long-
haul services, many of them unable to raise the necessary finance.
 Civair was due to start B747-300 Cape Town/London Stansted ‘low cost’ service
with paid catering and IFE. It did not obtain sufficient financial backing
 FlyAZUL planned B747-200 service from Buenos Aires to Madrid and on to
Delhi/Tokyo, with ‘innovative’ service: ‘Zen’ environment (quiet zone) and
personal network environment (passenger interaction)
 A new Barcelona based carrier plans to start low cost flights in mid-2009, similar
to carriers such as Oasis Hong Kong Airlines, Zoom Airlines and Air Asia X. It
will offer economy and premium-class services to four South American cities and
the US, undercutting existing fares by 20-40%
Tim Clark, Emirates President, put forward following scenario (Airline Business,
2005): an all economy class A380 with 760 seats, stripped of major galleys (only
beverage stations), passengers bring or buy in-flight meals/drinks, paid for IFE, 25kg
baggage free, flying from an LCC base such as London Stansted. He suggested that this
would allow a London/Adelaide roundtrip fare of US$530, a substantial reduction from
existing economy fares at that time.
In 2007, Ryanair announced plans to establish a low cost transatlantic operation in a
separate company to its European services. This appeared to be in response to
approaches from various US airports. The project awaits the next major downturn when
the airline expects to acquire cheap enough aircraft to make the flights viable. The plan
would be to have a fleet of around 40 to 50 long-haul aircraft, such as Boeing 787s,
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bases to serve five or six US destinations. However, the service would be two-class,
including a premium business product, not characteristic of shorter haul LCC
operations. Offering fares as low as €10, it expects the services, to secondary airports
such as Baltimore, Providence in Rhode Island and New York Long Island Islip
Macarthur to operate at very high load factors, with sales of food, drink, duty-free goods
and in-flight entertainment major revenue earners.
The above examples fall into two categories in terms of aircraft type: two-class,
large, existing aircraft, or smaller latest technology types to match their seat-km costs;
and very large high density all-economy aircraft (A380). The success rate of the first is
not good, and it relies on high volume city pairs to generate sufficient traffic to fill the
aircraft. The Ryanair proposal has the advantages of requiring less volume and offers
feed from existing bases, but depends crucially on obtaining new aircraft very cheaply.
The second type proposed by Emirates needs very high volume routes. On
short/medium haul the large cuts in fares might generate additional traffic (short breaks,
parties etc) that might make the route viable. But on long-hauls the disadvantages of
travel time, jet lag and total cost argue against this. Would Emirates itself offer this
service at the risk of cannibalising its own economy class traffic?
3. AirAsiaX
AirAsia X was set up in 2007 with 20% of its share capital held by AirAsia and 20%
by the Virgin Group. From November 2007 it operated only two long-haul routes from
Kuala Lumpur with a leased A330 aircraft: Hangzhou in China and Gold Coast in
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58”), the aircraft configured with 295 seats. From October 2008 it will start operating
its own daily A330s services with all economy 392 seats, expanding its point-to-point
network eventually to 45 cities as its 25 new aircraft are delivered by Airbus. Initially,
it plans to operate to Trichy in India and Perth in Australia, with a Japanese city and
London Stansted added in early 2009.
The lowest air fare for its Perth service will be around MYR300 one-way, compared
to Malaysian Airlines’ lowest fare of MYR399 (both excluding taxes). The
London/Kuala Lumpur flights fares are expected to start at MYR1,200 (£188).
The AirAsia X concept is described as ‘low cost long-haul, no frills’, but will have
assigned seating and two classes. However, the only premium class differentiator is a
fully-reclinable leather seat: all other frills such as meals will be common to both
classes and available at a price. The charge for a checked bag will vary depending on
weight. Meals will be MYR20 and be available in three options. Seat selection will
cost an additional MYR20, and extra legroom or a seat upgrade will cost MYR100.
AirAsia X clearly has many features that are similar to the recently failed Oasis
Hong Kong. The key difference is in the choice of Kuala Lumpur as its base or ‘hub’.
First this is not as competitive as Hong Kong; and second passengers will be able to
make their own connections there from AirAsia’s short/medium-haul flights (and at
London Stansted to European LCC flights). Oasis had suggested that 25% of its
passengers ‘self-connected’ to and from other LCCs (although these were not a major
feature of operations at its Hong Kong base), and it had been trying to negotiate an
interline agreement with these carriers before it went out of business.
84. Long-haul charter carriers
The European charter carriers have faced a serious challenge to their intra-EU leisure
business from the LCCs. Whereas unit costs for LCCs is 50-60% below that of network
airlines, the charter carrier can manage only 40% below (Teckentrup, 2007). It has also
been focused on origin country sales and summer only destinations. Thus over the past
10 years many European leisure carriers have re-positioned by converting many
previously designated charter flights to ‘scheduled’, and also switching to longer haul
destinations. LTU have made this move some years ago, now serving principally
leisure destinations in the US such as Florida, Los Angeles and New York, as well as
Thailand, the Maldives, Mauritius, China and South Africa. Interestingly, LTU’s new
owner, LCC Air Berlin, is considering withdrawing entirely from long-haul markets
(Sobie, 2008). Canadian LCC, Zoom, started transatlantic flights from Toronto to
Cardiff: but this replaced peak season charters, rather than introduced LCC model to
long-haul.
French carrier, Corsair, operates a daily all-economy class B747-400 with 582 seats
between Paris and some of France’s overseas territories such as Fort de France in the
Caribbean. This is a long-haul domestic flight that is peculiar to France, but of interest
here is that Corsair does not use these high-density B747-400s on long-haul
international routes.
Such long-haul flights carry a mix of inclusive tour and seat-only sales, but they have
not always been successful. For example, Britannia Airways used to offer charter
flights between UK and Australia using B767ER aircraft. This was discontinued due to
competition, even though a number of network carriers also withdrew service to cities
in Australia.
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destinations. These are sometimes operated for a limited number of months (seasonal)
and generally low frequency (less than daily). They also offer a premium class with
more comfortable seating and enhanced in-flight service. Almost 80% of UK long-haul
charter traffic in 2007 was destined for holiday destinations in either North America
(mainly Florida) or the Caribbean.
5. Potential LCC long-haul operators
Existing network or full service carriers have had little success in starting up their
own LCC (Morrell, 2005). They are thus unlikely to have an appetite to establish long-
haul LCCs Existing LCCs are more likely candidates with the largest European LCC
already putting forward proposals in this respect, and AirAsia close to introducing their
long-haul product. Those LCCs moving towards enhancing services such as easyJet
might also link their existing flights to long-hauls perhaps providing a baggage transfer
facility for an extra charge. However, easyJet’s CEO was reported to have ruled out
long-haul flying and also franchising its brand to another airline (Pilling, 2008).
As discussed above, charter or leisure carriers still depend on tour operators, sell
almost all their seats in origin countries, and package holidays, and tend to operate at
lower frequencies than needed by a competitive long-haul service.
Start-up airlines specialising on long-haul operations will also continue to emerge, as
did Oasis in Hong Kong. Their business plans tend to follow trends, for example most
recent start-ups focused on short/medium-haul low cost flights, but now these markets
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are becoming saturated. More long-haul opportunities are also being created through
more liberal Air Services Agreements.
6. Potential cost savings
It has been established above that the most likely operator of truly LCC long-haul
services would be either a start-up airline or a stand-alone operation of an existing LCC.
Each of the main reasons for LCC lower costs on short-haul routes will first be
examined, before quantifying potential advantages on long-hauls.
6.1. Faster turnaround of aircraft
One key source of cost advantage on short-hauls is faster aircraft turnrounds, partly
due to operating at less congested airports. This allows more rotations per day and
higher aircraft and crew utilisation. For long-haul on the other hand, longer ground
time from aircraft servicing and refuelling would be needed. Network carriers already
get up to 15 hours a day from aircraft. Any further increase will run up against time
zones and airport curfews, leaving aside the market reaction to 3am departures.
Secondary airports may not have sufficiently long runways, and maintenance and
handling support for less common long-haul aircraft may be not available or more
expensive.
6.2. No frills
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On short-hauls LCCs offer all economy seating at slightly lower seat pitch than
network carriers and paid catering (with limited hot snacks). No seat assignment takes
place for faster turnrounds, but this could be offered on long-hauls. Paid In-flight
Entertainment (IFE) would also make more sense on long-haul sectors, and Ryanair’s
unsuccessful trial of hand-held devices on short-hauls (Turner, 2005) could work on
long-haul. These could be pre-booked to avoid unnecessary weight of incorporating
them in seat backs.
6.3. Point-to-point markets only
On short-hauls, LCCs try to get the maximum amount of revenue per aircraft by
keeping aircraft flying as much as possible during the 6am to 11pm operating day. This
means short turnround times which also means no seat assignment, completing cabin
cleaning before landing to avoid these ground handling services and no connecting bags
or passengers. On long-hauls, time zones, night curfews and flying time would limit the
number of daily rotations that one aircraft made. This reduces the need for such
simplicity of product, although many of the simple attributes might be retained for cost
or ancillary revenue reasons. For example, the inspiration for many of today’s LCCs,
Southwest Airlines, is now actively seeking cross-border codeshare and interline
partners, signalling a change of emphasis over its still short-haul network (Ranson,
2008).
6.4. Higher productivity on long-haul?
12
Most of the productivity gains on long-haul will come from high seat densities,
although some of this will be lost if a two class seating configuration is adopted. There
is likely to be much less scope for working aircraft and crews more intensively than on
short-haul flights. Network carriers will also have high density cabins in Y class and
have the ability to drive fares in this cabin down to marginal costs.
6.5. Passenger load factor
easyJet achieved 85% on short/medium-haul services in 2006/07. This was not far
above AEA member airlines’ passenger load factor which averaged 82% on all their
long-haul flights, with 81% on the North Atlantic. Achieving higher crew productivity
might also be difficult: LCC crews overnight at base on short-haul; but there would be a
need to drop crews at outstations for long-haul.
6.6. Lower input prices
LCCs negotiate very hard on every input from third parties, and these techniques are
being copied by many network carriers. New entrant LCCs can benefit from low
aircraft costs (legacy airlines locked into higher costs) depending on the timing. More
established LCCs obtained very low unit aircraft prices from large orders. New entrant
LCCs can also hire younger cheaper pilots. LCCs avoid GDS fees/agents by
advertising and website/call centres, although this is less developed outside Europe and
North America. New entrant LCCs are not weighed down by legacy systems and
restrictive practices. Smaller orders will be made for long-haul aircraft by LCCs, such
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aircraft offering less competitive pricing and less liquid used markets; on the other
hand, some LCCs may save on buyer furnished equipment
Binggeli & Pompeo (2002) derived the major sources of LCC advantage compared
to a network carrier on short/medium haul routes. These were adjusted for a reference
stage length of 800km. The five areas listed in Table 1 accounted for three-quarters of
total network carrier operating costs, with the largest being distribution and passenger
services. Seat density gave a further 10% advantage, after allowing for all remaining
costs, some of which would be higher for the LCC.
Insert Table 1 here
Some of the LCC reduction in overheads should still apply to long-haul, given the
operator’s size and/or lean management. However, as Table 2 shows, this would be a
much lower share of total operating costs on long-haul. Distribution costs gave the
LCC an even larger difference but on long-haul this accounts for only around 6% of
total costs, and since the Binggeli & Pompeo study network carriers have made
significant moves towards internet distribution and reduced costs.2
Table 2 is based on unit costs reported by Virgin Atlantic Airways to the UK Civil
Aviation Authority (CAA, 2008). This cost data is shown in full in Appendix A. This
airline is one of the few full service carriers that relies more on point-to-point markets
than hub connections. It operates only long-haul (average sector length of just over
7,000km in 2006) to points such as New York, Los Angeles, Shanghai, Tokyo and
Johannesburg, all denser UK markets. These are the types of routes that a long-haul
2 British Airways’ 2007/08 annual report stated that one quarter of all its bookings were through its own
website ba.com. For AirAsia own website sales were just under 50%.
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LCC would need to fill aircraft at reasonable frequency (ie avoid long-haul leisure
routes where they would have no cost advantage over charter carriers).
Insert Table 2 here
Virgin Atlantic’s passenger service costs amounted to £26 (US$48) per passenger in
2006/07. This is elevated by the high service standards in the premium cabins (covered
by the higher fare revenue per passenger). A much lower figure would apply to a
network carrier’s Y-class services, and it is this that would be avoided by a LCC
through charging for in-flight catering, but the reduced cost and thus fare would be
lower in relation to long-haul economy class fares than for short-haul.
The Binggeli & Pompeo study also estimated that unit crew costs would be 43%
lower for LCCs, through lower salaries, higher crew productivity and reduced numbers
of crew needed. The latter referred only to cabin crew, which in Virgin’s case has been
inflated by the higher staffing ratios for premium cabins. There would still be a salary
advantage for a long-haul LCC, but cabin crew productivity would be largely the same
as for network carriers (apart from some carriers that have union imposed restrictions on
number of flights per month), with similar crew expenses. Cockpit crew productivity
should be similar, with somewhat lower salaries depending on availability of qualified
long-haul pilots.
Airport and handling charges would offer a much smaller potential for reduced costs:
first the share of these in total costs would be much lower (Hooper, 2005); second,
although secondary airports might allow lower landing charges and passenger fees,
handling would be more expensive since there would be few flights per day over which
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to spread the fixed costs. Selecting a LCC base at one end of the route would give some
advantages, but still small in relation to total operating costs.
One factor that Binggeli & Pompeo (2002) did not address was aircraft costs (eg
depreciation, interest and leasing). Initially a start-up long-haul LCC would have a
higher cost of capital and no opportunity to get low aircraft prices from large orders.
This may be mitigated by timing their start to coincide with a major industry downturn
when lease rates are low, although they would only lock in low rates for a few years at
best. Some of the established LCCs such as Ryanair and easyJet subsequently placed
vey large orders with aircraft manufacturers at substantial discounts on the list price. It
would be difficult to replicate this on long-haul although the acquisition of cheap
aircraft appears crucial to Ryanair’s plans for starting such services.
The UK CAA also examined the scope for long-haul no frills (LCC) cost saving
compared to network carriers and found that only 15% of operating costs per seat had a
‘high’ potential for savings, with a further 45% having ‘medium’ potential. This
compared to their assessment of short-haul LCC savings of 45% of costs with ‘high’
and a further 40% with ‘medium’ potential (CAA, 2007).
Seating density gives LCCs some advantage on short-haul, but for long-haul most
carriers already have closely packed seating in economy class (eg seat pitch of 31 inches
for British Airways and Lufthansa), with a comparison of all UK long-haul carriers
shown in Table 3. While easyJet offers only 29” on short-hauls, it is likely that it might
want to increase that to 30” or 31” for a 5-6 hour flight, little different from the
competition.
Insert Table 3 here
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Cargo carried in the lower deck makes a valuable contribution to the economics of
long-haul flights, and Virgin Atlantic generated £179m in revenue from this source in
2006/07, compared to an operating profit of only £15m. This revenue came from an
average of 10 tonnes of cargo per flight. This could also be achieved by an LCC, but an
all-economy configuration may inflate the number of passenger bags in the lower deck
at the expense of some cargo capacity. If the airline had introduced a charge for
checked baggage, its level would have to be high enough to displace cargo.3
A Boeing presentation to the BCA Industry Trends Forum estimated that a
transatlantic LCC would have 4% lower costs per flight and 43% lower unit costs than a
network carrier over the same sector, with 36% of the difference coming from higher
seat density (Boeing, 2007). For a 3,000 mile sector the break-even fare for a 223 seat
B787 would be US$460 compared to $260 for the same aircraft fitted with an all
economy class 375 seats.
Boeing gave the market share that a daily 300 seat LCC would have on the top ten
long-haul markets: 11% for London Heathow/New York JFK, 23% on Tokyo
Narita/Honolulu and between 30-37% on the remaining eight routes: high enough in
every case to stimulate a competitive reaction from incumbents. Many of these routes
are amongst the more profitable for network carriers and, even though profits are
generated by premium passengers and cargo, the loss of lower fare passengers would
reduce overall profits. Table 4 shows the Boeing estimates for a London/New York
service. The average passenger load factor was 80% for the LCC and 78.5% for the
network carrier. Their simplified model assumes that the LCC matches the average fare
in the lowest class of the network airline. The network carrier could drop their lowest
class fare from $300 to $250 and still make a profit of $12,350, well above that of the
3 Virgin Atlantic’s average revenue per kg of cargo in 2006/07 was just under US$2.
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LCC. If the LCC matched the $250 fare at 75% load factor it would make a loss of
$11,700.
Insert Table 4 here
The Boeing model provides a good framework for examining the likely impact on
profit of competitive responses from network carriers, remembering that this was one of
the key factors in the demise of Laker Airways. The overall cost reduction was
assumed by Boeing to be only 4%, compared to the slightly more optimistic 6%
estimated in Table 2. A comparison of unit costs between a multi-class and single class
operation is not especially meaningful, since it is the average and marginal costs of
offering Y-class seats that is relevant.
Taking the Boeing analysis a step further, the total operating costs for the multi-class
network carrier aircraft can be allocated to class to allow a proper comparison of Y-
class average costs (Doganis, 2002). Furthermore, marginal costs in the Y-cabin will be
much lower than average costs and thus the network carrier competitive reaction could
undercut the LCC by a much larger margin than assumed above.
An analogous situation in reverse existed in the 1970s on the North Atlantic. At that
time charter or group traffic took 25% of the market and scheduled 60%. Group traffic
was not allowed to be carried on scheduled flights and scheduled carriers operated their
own charters (40% of the charter market), even though they had a growing surplus
capacity on scheduled flights. Price discrimination based on different price elasticities
of demand on scheduled flights allowed the use of larger more efficient aircraft to the
benefit of all classes of passenger or market segments (Friedman, 1976). Once the rules
were relaxed the single-class charters disappeared.
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7. New traffic generation or diversion?
LCCs are generally thought to have stimulated a considerable amount of new traffic
from their very low fares, in addition to some diversion from network and charter
carriers. However, research by the UK CAA suggests that the LCCs have played a
smaller role in stimulating traffic than attracting passengers from other modes (CAA,
2005):
‘While it is not possible to assess with precision the extent to which no-frills
growth is due to traffic generation or to traffic substitution, the above analysis
suggests that, whilst there is clearly some stimulation of traffic, a significant
factor in the growth of no frills carriers has been their success in taking market
share from incumbent airlines. In particular this traffic has come from charter
carriers, perhaps to a much greater extent than has been recognised previously.’
This is contrast to the US situation where more air traffic has been generated through
diversion from surface modes.
The UK CAA survey of Heathrow and Gatwick passengers in 2005 revealed that
60% of short-haul and only 20% of long-haul leisure trips were of up to seven days’
duration. For the two largest short/medium-haul LCCs, 70-80% of trips averaged up to
seven days, and just over 40% of up to four days. Generating new traffic in the ‘seven
days or more’ category will face the problem that the air fare and the ground costs will
be a sizeable amount. Visiting Friends and Relatives (VFR) traffic will probably avoid
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some of the ground costs (eg hotel and local travel), but the further away the destination
the higher the cost, even with the lowest LCC fares.
UK residents travelling by air to Europe for leisure purposes spent an average of
£560 on their holiday in 2004, of which only 27% was accounted for by the air fare
(CAA, 2005). Thus attempts to stimulate traffic are likely to have been restricted to the
short breaks part of that market where perhaps only 3-4 days of non-air expenses are
incurred. The income levels of existing LCC markets is also likely to be well below the
average for long-haul trips.4 The UK Office of National Statistics reported that the
average spending by UK residents on holiday visits to North America was £999 in 2007
(including the air fare) in contrast to only £538 for VFR visits. Comparing these with
an average Y-class fare of £400-500 suggests that VFR has much the greater potential
but large cuts in air fares would be necessary to generate new traffic. The cost analysis
above indicates that such cuts may not be possible.
8. Need for connecting traffic
High density long-haul services will offer at least 300 seats per flight, and need daily
or five weekly frequencies. This means that they need a market share of at least
175,000 passengers. Otherwise they would be restricted to leisure markets such as
Thailand, the Caribbean and Florida, where low frequencies are more suited to package
holidays. As discussed above, such flights already exist and are usually described as
charter or leisure flights. The UK has some of the denser world markets and the top 40
of these in 2007 are shown in Appendix B.
4 35% of LCC easyJet’s UK passengers are estimated to earn less than £23,000 a year (Scott-Gall, 2008).
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Table 5 shows the importance of feed to long-haul flights from the UK. Many of the
regional groups of routes had considerable feed at the UK end, and the sizeable Far East
and Middle East routes had a similar amount of feed at the other end. India has a large
ethnic and VFR market that might suit LCC operations, but feeder traffic might also be
needed there.
Insert Table 5 here
Short/medium-haul LCCs do not offer feeder facilities or transfers, but passengers
can always arrange this themselves (‘self-connect’). Ryanair is estimated to carry
around 17% of its traffic on this basis, with its London Stansted base particularly
attractive for passengers originating in Scotland or Ireland. Passengers without checked
bags would find it easier to self-connect, since clearing immigration to collect their bag
would not be necessary. Many trips in the US are of this nature, and there are websites
there that sell two or more sector trips under one payment. Southwest reported that
78% of its passengers fly non-stop, with the remaining 22% having an on-line
connection.5 Existing short/medium-haul levels of LCC connectivity look low relative
to long-haul requirements, especially given the need to fill large aircraft. However, an
LCC might in the future introduce on-line transfers to connect with long-haul flights, or
at least enable airside pick-up of checked bags.
9. Conclusions
5 From 2005, it also offered very limited interline connections with ATA, for example to destinations
such as Hawaii and Dallas Fort Worth that Southwest did not serve (Southwest, 2008).
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A key question for airline management, governments and related policy-makers is
whether the very successful, largely short-haul LCC business model can work over
long-haul sectors? British Airways’ 2007/08 annual report suggested that this market
had already been effectively served by charter carriers for a number of years. But
successful LCCs in Europe and Asia have serious plans to enter these markets.
The LCC business model has managed to lower unit costs by 50-60% or more
compared to network carriers by simplifying processes (including cutting out frills),
higher labour and asset productivity, and fierce negotiation with labour and outside
suppliers. Some of that gap has since been eroded.
On the market side, some very low fares became possible as a result of the lower cost
base, and a different approach to pricing and distribution. A price-elastic market
ensured that a sufficient number of passengers could be generated to give 80% or more
load factors year-round using economic sized aircraft. This was possible because of the
simplified fare structure, one-way pricing and very transparent web-based distribution.
How do these supply and demand-side aspects translate to long-haul success? On the
cost side, the following problems arise:
 Fuel is a much larger part of long-haul costs, and there is less scope for large
reductions in fuel burn per passenger
 There is less opportunity for greater labour and aircraft productivity: much of the
LCC advantage here lies at the two ends of the route, and these costs account for a
smaller share of the total
 Seat factors are already very high on long-haul routes
 Some aspects of the simplified product would become more complex: scheduling
(eg night curfews), in-flight catering, transfers, air cargo
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The potential for discounting well below current low fares and for generating new
markets is lower: less price-elastic markets and smaller discounts mean less passenger
generation. Furthermore, the absolute cost, time differences, and flight duration will all
deter the short break market. Some of the key new short-haul markets, such as property
owners, ‘stag/hen’ and school parties would be unlikely to go long-haul in anything like
the same numbers. The exception to this might be the shorter ‘long-haul’ markets such
as, for example, London to New York, and perhaps even Florida. VFR would also seem
the market segment with the most potential for new traffic generation.
Charters already operate on selected long-haul routes. None of these are operated
with aircraft larger than the B767/A330 types, because these point-to-point markets are
not large enough. All-economy B747-400 aircraft would also offer attractive unit costs,
but few markets are large enough. The A380 promises 15-20% lower unit costs than
the B747-400, hardly sufficient to give the 50% lower unit costs that LCCs enjoy in
Europe, and there will be fewer cost advantages from LCC product features that
network carriers do not already have. An all-economy (760 seats) A380 would need an
annual long-haul market of almost 500,000 passengers to make a reasonable profit.
This is well above the densest long-haul UK charter markets.
This highlights the importance of connecting passengers to long-haul operations. If
the low-cost A380 cannot generate new markets, it would need to divert a sizeable part
of these existing local passengers, and the reaction will be fierce.
High density A380 or B747 flights would need most of the lower deck for checked
bags and would not have any contribution from cargo. A logical development for these
flights would be to charge for all checked baggage (as proposed by AirAsia X).
Network carriers have the advantage of economies of scope from combining both
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passengers/cargo and the various passenger market segments. If they can automate,
innovate and control costs they will be tough to compete against.
An existing LCC operating long-haul from its major bases would seem to be a better
option, but self-connect may not be sufficient, and the sum of the sector fares may limit
their cost effectiveness compared to the deep discounts offered by network carriers via
their hubs.
In conclusion, the above is based on economics and a view of what rationale
investors might take into account. That has never prevented experiments in the past,
and thus there are likely to be many low-cost long-haul attempts in the future.
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Cost/ASK (US
cents)
Network LCC
LCC %
reduction
Overheads 1.1 0.6 -45
Distribution 1.9 0.2 -89
Passenger services 0.8 0.0 -100
Crew costs 1.4 0.8 -43
Airport/handling 3.8 1.2 -68
Total above 9.0 2.8 -69
Total after seat density 12.0 4.5 -63
Table 1: Cost advantage of an intra-European LCC
US cents at 2001 prices. Source: Binggeli & Pompeo (2002)
% short-
haul
%
long-haul
Long-haul
LCC reduction
%
Overhead 9.2 6.6 -30
Distribution 15.8 5.9 -40
Passenger services 6.7 7.2 -80
Crew costs 11.7 10.9 -20
Airport/handling 31.7 7.5 -50
Total above 75.0 37.9 -42
Other costs 25.0 62.1 10
Total operating costs 100.0 100.0 -6
Table 2: Major areas of LCC cost advantage: share of short and long-haul costs
Source: Binggeli & Pompeo (2002) for short-haul and author for long-haul
Short-haul based on AEA member airline adjusted to 800km, long-haul based on Virgin
Atlantic in 2006.
Economy Premium
economy
First Choice 33” 36"
British Airways 31” 38"
Virgin Atlantic 31" 38"
bmi 32" 38"
MyTravel 30" 35"
Monarch 31" 34"
Thomas Cook 30” 34”
Thomsonfly 33" 37"
Table 3: Lower class seat density on long-haul flights: selected UK carriers, 2007
Source: BATA website, July 2008
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Passengers
%
Passengers Fare
$
Revenue
$
Network airline:
First 5 8 2,200 17,600
Business 10 18 1,500 27,000
Premium Y 20 35 700 24,500
Y 65 113 300 33,900
Total revenue $ 100 175 103,000
Total costs $ 85,000
Profit $ 18,000
LCC:
Total revenue $ 300 300 90,000
Total costs $ 82,000
Profit $ 8,000
Table 4: London/New York B787 service by airline business model
Source: Boeing (2007)
Passengers
(m)
Point-
to-point
Connect
at UK end
only
Connect at
other end only
Connect
at both
ends
North America 19.5 49% 27% 17% 7%
Far East 6.1 35% 20% 32% 12%
Middle East 5.1 32% 24% 34% 10%
Africa 3.5 50% 33% 10% 8%
Indian subcontinent 2.1 55% 30% 11% 4%
Latin America/Caribbean 2.0 61% 25% 10% 4%
Australasia 0.9 44% 36% 13% 7%
Total 39.3 46% 26% 20% 8%
Table 5. Connections made by passengers on scheduled long-haul services at Heathrow,
Gatwick and Manchester, 2005. Source: CAA Passenger Survey, 2005, in CAA (2007)
$460 $260 $300 $700
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Appendix A
UK£ (000) %
Aircraft fuel 489,418 27.2
Aircraft rentals 203,068 11.3
Maintenance/overhaul: total 149,346 8.3
Passenger services 128,860 7.2
General & administration 118,005 6.6
Cabin crew total 112,599 6.3
Flight crew total 83,078 4.6
ATC related 70,933 3.9
Depreciation/amortisation 58,979 3.3
Commissions 58,772 3.3
Handling/parking fees 57,467 3.2
Cargo specific 51,216 2.8
Passenger departure fees 39,473 2.2
Station costs 37,803 2.1
Advertising 34,472 1.9
Reservations 33,944 1.9
Landing/departure fees 28,231 1.6
Other 26,169 1.5
Sales 13,226 0.7
Aircraft insurance 3,251 0.2
Pax insurance 2,814 0.2
Total operating costs 1,801,124 100.0
Cost per ASK (US cents) 6.9
Operating costs by category for Virgin Atlantic Airways, FY ended 28/8/07
Derived from CAA (2008)
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Appendix B
UK airport Foreign airport Total Scheduled Charter
HEATHROW NEW YORK (JF KENNEDY) 2,839,221 2,839,221 0
HEATHROW CHICAGO (O'HARE) 1,604,770 1,604,770 0
HEATHROW HONG KONG (CHEP LAP KOK) 1,453,229 1,453,229 0
HEATHROW LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL 1,405,694 1,405,694 0
HEATHROW SINGAPORE 1,074,672 1,074,672 0
HEATHROW WASHINGTON (DULLES) 1,054,834 1,054,834 0
HEATHROW SAN FRANCISCO 1,032,103 1,032,103 0
HEATHROW TORONTO 1,023,559 1,023,559 0
HEATHROW MUMBAI 1,005,900 1,005,900 0
HEATHROW BOSTON 888,883 888,883 0
HEATHROW TOKYO (NARITA) 885,763 885,763 0
HEATHROW MIAMI INTERNATIONAL 833,650 833,650 0
HEATHROW SYDNEY 824,439 824,439 0
HEATHROW NEW YORK (NEWARK) 710,319 709,997 322
GATWICK ORLANDO 686,564 686,564 0
HEATHROW BANGKOK SUVARNABHUMIAIRPORT 672,199 672,038 161
HEATHROW DELHI 664,718 664,718 0
HEATHROW VANCOUVER 542,154 542,154 0
GATWICK HOUSTON 482,413 482,413 0
GATWICK BRIDGETOWN 476,928 401,049 75,879
HEATHROW KUALA LUMPUR (SEPANG) 431,446 431,446 0
GATWICK DALLAS/FORT WORTH 404,294 404,294 0
GATWICK ATLANTA 395,687 395,632 55
HEATHROW MELBOURNE 386,608 386,608 0
HEATHROW MONTREAL (DORVAL) 351,613 351,613 0
HEATHROW SHANGHAI (PU DONG) 347,381 347,381 0
HEATHROW AUCKLAND INTERNATIONAL 343,517 343,517 0
MANCHESTER SANFORD 334,034 0 334,034
MANCHESTER ORLANDO 333,091 333,091 0
HEATHROW CALGARY 325,625 325,625 0
GATWICK NEW YORK (NEWARK) 301,563 301,563 0
HEATHROW COLOMBO 293,801 293,801 0
GATWICK LAS VEGAS 290,214 290,214 0
HEATHROW SEOUL (INCHEON) 288,620 288,620 0
HEATHROW BEIJING 279,086 279,086 0
MANCHESTER CHICAGO (O'HARE) 269,070 269,070 0
GATWICK TORONTO 264,519 253,223 11,296
GATWICK SANFORD 261,616 0 261,616
HEATHROW MAURITIUS 253,671 253,671 0
HEATHROW SEATTLE (TACOMA) 248,670 248,670 0
Passengers between UK airports and non-EEA destinations (top 40 long-haul), 2007
Source: UK CAA Airport Statistics, 2007
